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FOREWORD: TALKING AND TRADING
Bruce A. Ackerman*
1. I encounter you and seek your cooperation. You are reluctant. How
to proceed?
First: I can talk to you and try to persuade you to define yourself in
a way that makes you want to work with me for our common good.
Second: I can take you as you are and try to bargain with you,
offering you something you want in exchange for the thing I want.
What to do? Talking offers a distinctive kind of satisfaction. In the
end, we may succeed in coming to an understanding of what we are
about. And that is no small thing.
2. But talking takes time. Too much time: given the billions of people
on this planet, I can reach a deep dialogic understanding with a ridicu-
lously small number of my fellows before I die.
So trading is a way of coping with death, economizing on time. To
protest against the market is as futile-and as necessary-as protesting
against death.
3. Suppose, then, that I despair of talking to you in a way that may
ultimately allow us to come to a deep mutual understanding. I offer,
instead, a trade: tit for tat.
But you, unaccountably, refuse. Instead, you threaten me with uni-
lateral action-action threatening my own plans for myself. What next?
4. There is always force. We may simply give up the effort to come to
terms with one another, and lose ourselves in the struggle of all against
all. Is there another way out?
5. It is here where law enters: granted that we cannot hope to achieve
some deep understanding, can't we aim for something that is both less
and more than this? Less, in that we will inevitably remain strangers to
one another in countless ways. More, in that the law may allow us to
achieve a form of mutual understanding that permits us to proceed with
the business of life without undertaking the impossible task of befriend-
ing the world.
A legal conversation, then, is both alienating and liberating at the
same time. Alienating, because we must renounce the hope of inti-
macy; liberating, because we may come to terms with one another in a
way that enables our ongoing cooperation.
And yet, if this hope is to succeed, we must somehow find a vocab-
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ulary that allows us to express this complex form of alienating
empowerment.
6. It is here where we may glimpse the promise of law and economics.
For economics, no less than law, is a very distinctive form of talk. It
concerns human beings strictly in their capacity as traders, hence as
people who have already-for the best of reasons-despaired of reach-
ing an intimate form of association with one another. To introduce
homo'economicus into a legal conversation amounts to the following pro-
posal: Granted that we cannot talk to everyone as if he were our friend,
can't we at least talk to him as if we might bargain our way to mutually
acceptable terms of cooperation?
7. But, you are certain to protest, isn't the proposal of law and eco-
nomics based on a non sequitur? After all, you and I would never have
come to the law at all if we had bargained successfully with one another.
How, then, can law-talk about hypothetical bargaining permit us to
come to a legal understanding of our dispute when our effort at real
bargaining has already been in vain?
8. To which I answer: perhaps what law and economics is trying to
teach us is to become better bargainers. This suggestion allows us to
appreciate one of the more remarkable aspects of this Symposium: for
here you will find a series of lawyer-economists taking a remorselessly
ex ante approach to everything they discuss. If we had begun to bargain
at a time long before our dispute arose on the surface of everyday life,
they seem to be telling us, then we would have been able to come to a
mutually beneficial agreement. Given the difficulty of sustaining more
intimate relationships, should we not, at least, do the best job we can at
bargaining our way to mutually acceptable terms?
9. A modest proposal, and surely not one to be disdained by anyone
mindful of the finitude of human life. This much, at least, you must
concede.
10. If this is so, I hope that you will not allow some loose talk of "effi-
ciency"-which also appears in these pages-to blind you to the value
of this Symposium. Long after extreme claims for "efficiency" have
been forgotten, law and economics will be remembered for the new
rigor with which it allowed the law to emphasize hidden bargaining
possibilities that might otherwise be neglected in social life.'
Consider, for example, the way that the ex ante perspective of the
lawyer-economist has revolutionized the study of tort law. No longer
do lawyers treat an automobile accident as if the only interesting ques-
tions involved the behavior of the parties during the last minutes before
the collision took place. Instead, modern tort theory invites us to con-
1. See, e.g., the dialogue between Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Law and Eco-
nomics: An Introduction, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 991 (1985) on one hand, and Kelman,
Comment on Hoffman and Spitzer's "Experimental Law and Economics," 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 1037 (1985) on the other, concerning the use of experimental methods in law and
economics.
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sider the ways you and I might have bargained with one another at a
time when we had not yet embarked upon a collision course. Would
you have agreed to insure against the accident? Would I have agreed
to buy a safer car? As the work of the last generation demonstrates, 2
the effort to ask such questions systematically cannot help but enrich
our ongoing effort to come to terms with the accident problem in mod-
em society.3
11. And yet it is precisely this new rigor that will, in the end, establish
ever more clearly the limitations of law and economics as a form of
legal discourse. As the lawyer-economist eagerly points out all the ways
we could have bargained our way, ex ante, to a mutually satisfactory rela-
tionship, it will also become clear how many other disputes we never
could have resolved through bargaining.
The law and economics of auto accidents, after all, typically takes
us back to a time when we were still adults, with a relatively clear sense
of who we were and what we wanted out of life. All that you and I are
invited to do is to imagine that we did not first encounter one another
in the emergency lane of Interstate 95, but could instead bargain over
whether you or I should buy insurance, drive a car with rubber bump-
ers, and so forth.
Things become a good deal trickier when the lawyer-economist in-
vites us to talk about conditions obtaining the day before yesterday:
say, at a time when I was receiving a liberal education in expensive
schools with caring teachers, while you were cooped up in a place
where "education" consisted of low-grade incarceration. Here it makes
no sense to speak of the way you and I might have bargained our way to
a mutually satisfactory understanding about the best way to allocate ed-
ucation, for the simple reason that you and I were not yet competent
bargainers.
While the law and economics of auto accidents directs our atten-
tion to hypothetical bargains that could be reached by real-world bar-
gainers, the law and economics of primary education involves the
hypothetical bargains of hypothetical bargainers. And the same thing is
true about many of the most fundamental questions with which the law
deals: just as you and I could not have bargained over our primary
education, so too we could not have bargained over our initial endow-
2. Since the study of accident law has generated an enormous literature, it is not an
appropriate subject for a symposium exploring new directions for law and economics.
For those wishing to assess the heartland of the discipline, the best starting place re-
mains G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970), which, for all the analytic advances
of the last 15 years, remains the single best example of sustained and sophisticated legal
argument within the ex ante economic framework.
3. For further reflections upon the significance of ex ante thinking, see B.
Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 46-72 (1984); Easterbrook, The Supreme
Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
4, 19-33 (1984); Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 591, 600-42 (1981).
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ments of material goods or genetic abilities. Yet it is these initial en-
dowments that profoundly shape our success in real-world bargaining
throughout our lives.
Is it not past time, then, for lawyer-economists to recognize up-
front that you and I were not born yesterday?4
12. Such a question should, at the very least, force the lawyer-econo-
mist to take with far greater seriousness his relationship to the ongoing
development of social contract philosophy. After John Rawls, we all
should be aware of how small differences in the way in which hypotheti-
cal bargainers are described may lead to very large differences in the
nature of the ex ante social contracts they will reach. If, then, the lawyer-
economist is to talk about initial endowments in the bargaining spirit,
he must self-consciously attend to the fine-grained structure of his ex
ante analysis: what precisely are we assuming about our hypothetical bar-
gainers? Can we defend these assumptions in a reflective way, drawing
on the best of the tradition of social contract philosophy?5
13. This, then, is one potentially fruitful direction for law and econom-
ics: to develop self-consciously its links to contractarian political phi-
losophy. It is not, however, the road I will travel. Rather than
extending bargaining analysis to an unreal world of hypothetical bar-
gainers, I myself believe that we should restrict the domain of bargain-
ing metaphors in legal conversation. 6
For me, there is a vast difference between speculating about hypo-
thetical bargains you and I might in fact have struck, and the bargains
that might appeal to hypothetical you's and I's. While I find the former
instructive, I find the latter mystifying: I do not see any good reason to
be bound by deals that might be reached by somebody who wasn't me;
and calling the deal a "social contract" only serves to obscure the fact
that no flesh-and-blood creature could ever in fact have bargained his
way to the "contract. ' 7
14. But if this is right, then lawyer-economists have their work cut out
for them. Rather than overextending bargaining metaphors, we must
4. This question cannot be avoided even by lawyer-economists who modestly limit
themselves to subjects like torts and contracts which characteristically involve genuine
or hypothetical bargains by real-world bargainers. As Alvin Klevorick suggests, such
issues are deeply affected by presuppositions about the basic structure of society within
which the particular tort, contract, or crime is embedded. See Klevorick, Legal Theory
and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1985).
5. For Rawls' most recent efforts to justify his favored conception of the original
position, see Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Phil. 515, 545-50
(1980) (choice between thick and thin veils of ignorance).
6. I therefore welcome the new interest in the law and economics of inalienability
evidenced in this Symposium by Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Prop-
erty Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931 (1985) and Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 970 (1985).
7. For further elaboration, see B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State ch.
10 (1980).
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learn to put them in their place as part-but only part-of a larger non-
contractual understanding of the normative aims of the legal system.
Progress will come only by trichotomizing the domain of legal dis-
course. First, we must recognize the distinctive character of those legal
relationships that do rest upon genuine bargains by-real-world people.
Here, we must reflect more deeply upon the normative conditions a
bargain must satisfy before it should count as "genuine" and demar-
cate more clearly the legal problems which may appropriately be
treated as genuine bargains. To what extent, for example, should mod-
em corporation law be treated as if it involved genuine bargaining be-
tween management and shareholders?9
Having answered questions like this, we may proceed to demarcate
a second legal domain involving hypothetical bargaining by real-world
people. Here we encounter legal problems, like those raised by car ac-
cidents, where it is obvious that you and I didn't bargain with one an-
other over the terms of our interaction before we collided into one
another. Nonetheless, with the aid of law and economics, we might
well define terms that we would have agreed upon, ex ante, if transaction
costs had not made it impossible to deal with one another before we
collided.
As I have suggested, much of modern law and economics has been
developed to treat problems like this. While much more remains to be
done, the increasingly technical character of the modelling should not
be allowed to obscure the fundamental normative question raised by
the entire analytical procedure. After all, our legal tradition has often
sharply distinguished between legal relationships based on genuine
bargains and those that might have been, but in fact were not,
grounded on a real-world contract. Imagine, for example, that a law-
yer-economist demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that if you and I
had encountered one another at Time One, you would have agreed to
buy a widget from me for one hundred dollars. Suppose now, at Time
Two, that the bottom has dropped out of the widget market and that I
try to recover damages from you on the basis of this hypothetical con-
tract. Surely this would not be enough to win a traditional lawsuit. So
far as the law of contract is concerned, there is all the difference be-
tween hypothetical, and actual, consent. While I will obtain damages if
you did consent, I won't get anything merely by proving that you would
have consented if I had asked.
If, then, I cannot appeal to hypothetical bargaining to create a
binding contract, why does the lawyer-economist suppose that I can
8. For a recent penetrating discussion, see Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive
Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472 (1980).
9. For the ongoing debate, see the recent symposium Corporations and Private
Property, 26J. L. & Econ. 235-496 (1983), marking the 50th anniversary of the publica-
tion by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means of their seminal work The Modem Corporation
and Private Property (1932).
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properly appeal to it to support my legal claims in other contexts?
There are, doubtless, many answers to this question-some better than
others. There is a danger, however, that the lawyer-economists of the
next generation will not even try to frame a discriminating response,
but will instead devote themselves entirely to the refinement of their
economic models of bargaining behavior. So long as we remain lawyer-
economists, however, no amount of mathematical sophistication will
compensate for a deep and systematic normative analysis of the condi-
tions under which I may legitimately appeal to your hypothetical con-
sent to impose a legal obligation upon you that you otherwise would
not have labored under.
Even if such explanations are forthcoming, they should not be ex-
tended casually to resolve a third domain of legal dispute. Here we do
not deal with the hypothetical bargains of flesh-and-blood human be-
ings, let alone genuine contracts. Instead, you and I must confront the
fact that we could never have bargained over some of the questions that
most profoundly shape the course of our lives--most notably, those in-
volving the distribution of initial endowments of wealth, education, and
talent. If this recognition leads us-as I think it should-to abandon
bargaining metaphors completely in this third domain of discourse,
how are lawyer-economists to conduct a plausible legal conversation
about the problem of initial endowments?
15. However difficult this question may be, we should never allow it so
to unsettle us that we lose touch with the sound instinct that led us to
law and economics in the first place. While bargaining talk may be an
inadequate response to the problem of initial entitlements, at least it
does have one virtue: it permits us to recognize that you and I cannot
try to resolve our conflicts by speaking to one another as if we all might
become, in the end, members of one big happy family. Whatever else
may be obscure, at least this much should be clear: the legal discourse
that puts bargaining in its place cannot do so by supposing that all of us
could somehow sustain the deep sense of mutual understanding and
commitment that is a rare and precious achievement even in small
groups. 10
16. How, then, to proceed? Is there a credible form of legal discourse
that allows us to confront the fact that we can't all be friends without
pretending that we might solve all our difficulties by bargaining?
10. I do not think it necessary to say how small a group has to be before it may
plausibly hope for a deeper kind of dialogic solidarity than the kind that the law can
hope to provide. Aristotle thought the sound of the human voice set the natural limit;
while modern methods do much to amplify the voice, they are less successful in sus-
taining the complex relationships that make deep dialogue rewarding. See Aristotle,
Politics, Bk. 7, ch. 4, at 292 (E. Barker trans. 1952) (In a large state, nobody can govern
"unless he has Stentor's voice."). For present purposes, however, it is unnecessary to
say whether the limit of deep communication is reached in groups of 100 or 1000 or
10,000 or 100,000. The number remains small in comparison with the population of the
United States, let alone the world.
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